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Porphyry and Plotinus on the Reality o f Relations
Both Plotinus and Porphyry contribute in their own ways to the tradition of 
neoplatonic commentaries on Aristotle’s Categories. In 6.1-2, Plotinus argues that 
Aristotle’s ten categories are not adequate as an account of the genera of Being and 
that for this purpose they ought to be supplanted by the five greatest kinds from 
Plato’s Sophist.' In 6.3, he acknowledges that it would be desirable to have a system 
of categories, not genera, for the sensible realm. He proposes several reductions of 
Aristotle’s ten categories to more compact schemes and finally seems to settle on the 
number five: composite, relative, quantity, quality and motion. The extent to which 
Porphyry was at odds with Plotinus over the value of Aristotle’s Categories is the 
subject of debate.1 2 Porphyry is certainly keen to claim that the work is about ‘simple 
significant words insofar as they signify things’ (in Cat. 58,5) and defends it against 
critics who claim that Aristotle has got the number of divisions wrong (in Cat. 
59,10-34).3 In what follows I argue that Porphyry has managed to get clear about 
relations and relational properties in a way that Plotinus has not. As a result, the 
latter is not well placed to meet potential objections to the autonomy of Aristotle’s 
category of relatives. Since this is a category that Plotinus seems to retain in his own 
five-fold system, this is a problem for him.
L A ristotle’s category of relatives
Chapter 7 of Aristotle's Categories is rather like the tar baby: commenting 
on τα πρός τι gets you stuck to an intractable vocabulary for discussing relations. 
This is because relatives, or τά πρός τι, are not conceived by Aristotle as relations, 
though the extension of relatives includes some terms we can clearly see are re­
lations. The difference between relatives and relations can best be illustrated by 
focusing on the problem of the ontological category of τά πρός τι: are they the 
subjects between which a relation obtains, the relation, or the relational property? 
The fact that there is no clear answer to this question suggests that whatever 
Categories 7 is a theory of, it is probably not of relations as we understand them.
Can relatives be relations? It seems not, since there are things which count 
as relatives but which are not plausibly thought of as relations. Perception, perhaps.
1 The Enneads will be cited by chapter and line numbers in the edition of P. Henry and H. 
Schwyzer (Oxford, 1964-82).
2 Strange discusses the extent to which earlier commentators may have over mphasized the 
differences between Porphyry and Plotinus in the introduction to his translation. Porphyry: On 
Aristotle Categories (London, 1992), 1-12.
3 A. Busse (ed.) Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca IV. 1 (Berlin, 1887).
is a relation between an object or a sense datum and a percipient. Though Aristotle 
lists perception (αΐσθησις) among the relatives (6b3), he also lists the object of 
perception (αισθητόν) among the relatives. One m ight think, then, that Aristotle 
has lumped together in a single category both relations and relata. Were this so, we 
might say that at least some of τά πρός τι are relations. However, it is also claimed 
that the αισθητόν is prior to αΐσθησις (7b35). One might have the view that the 
things which stand in relations must have other non-relational properties. This 
question must be distinguished from the question of whether relata, qua relata, are 
prior to the relations which relate them. It seems clear that they are not. Thus, 
Aristotle’s category of τά πρός τι cannot be thought of as one which includes both 
relations and relata per se. If he meant to discuss relata per se, then he has surely 
said the wrong thing about them.
Another intially promising suggestion is that τά πρός τι are the relational 
properties which qualify the relata between which a relation obtains.4 By a relational 
property, I mean a one place property which has a relation and an object as 
constitutents.5 Thus, if aRb, then a, in addition to being a subject of the relation R, is 
also the subject for the relational property standing-in-R-to-something or perhaps 
standing-in-R-to-b. That relatives might be relational properties of this sort is 
suggested by the stripping argument (7a26-bl0). You can test whether you have 
identified the proper correlative, i.e. what the relative is o f or in relation to, by 
stripping the relative of everything except the purported correlative. So, suppose that 
we say that the correlative of wing is bird. If you strip away everything except being 
a bird, then the reciprocation does not remain. A wing is a wing o f a bird, but a bird 
is not a bird by or o f a wing. Rather, a winged thing is a winged thing by or on 
account of a wing. (Cf. knowledge is knowledge o f a knowable and a knowable is 
known by knowledge.) The things which are being stripped away in this thought 
experiment seem to be properties. However, properties do not come into existence or
4 This interpretation is defended at length by Mario Mignucci in ‘Aristotle’s Definition of 
Relatives in Categories T , Phronesis 31 (1986), 101-27.
5 Khamara (‘Indiscernibles and the Absolute Theory of Space and Time’, Studia Leibnitiana, 
Band XX/2 (1988), 140-59) attempts to tidy up the notion of a relational property in this way: 
‘P is a positive relational property if and only if, for any individual, x, x’s having P consists in 
x’s having a certain relation to at least one individual’ (p. 144). (In his analysis, positive 
relational properties are distinguished from negative ones. The former consist in a thing’s 
having a relation to something else while the latter consist in its lacking a relation to 
something else.) There is room to draw a further distinction between those positive relational 
properties which consist in x’s standing in a relation to something and those which consist in 
x’s standing in a relation to some particular thing. The latter Khamara calls ‘impure 
relational properties’.
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get destroyed, but this is exactly what is claimed for relatives at 7bl5.6 Relatives and 
their correlatives, with some exceptions, come into being and are destroyed together.
Might τα πρός τι then be instances of relational properties? Aristotle is 
very concerned to avoid the conclusion that no relative is a substance (8al4-36) and 
apparently modifies his criterion for inclusion among the relatives just to avoid such 
a conclusion. But no property instance is itself a substance and surely the author of 
Categories chapters 2-5 is in as good a position to know this as anyone.7 8 Thus, if 
relatives are instances of relational properties, Aristotle's worry is utterly mysterious.
It remains that relatives might be the things which are the subjects of 
relations or relational properties. That is, they might be the relata between which a 
relation obtains, considered not merely insofar as they are relata. In this sense, it is 
very easy to see why Aristotle might be concerned about the question of whether 
relatives are substances. If a hand is a relative thing and also a substance by virtue of 
being a part of a substance, then one might be very concerned that the hand qua hand 
is a substance. But even this will not do in the final analysis. At the end of Chapter 
8 Aristotle is concerned that many of the things which are counted under quality will 
be relatives. It turns out that it is the genus knowledge which is a relative. The 
particular kinds of knowlege, like grammar, are not relatives and it is these 
particular kinds which are possessed and by virtue of which a person is said to be 
knowing.* Thus, when Aristotle says in Categories 7 that knowledge is among the 
relatives, he cannot mean by that the person who has the knowledge.9
6I take it that in the Categories accidental properties are among those things which are both 
present in and said of a subject. Thus, knowledge is present in the soul and said of the 
science of the grammatical man. Even if  these secondary non-substances are dependent upon 
substances, perhaps even more strongly than secondary substances are, the eternity o f the 
world precludes the possibility that the properties, as opposed to the property instances, 
should come into existence or be destroyed.
''Cat. 2a34-b7 makes it clear that what is present in a subject (i.e. property instances) depends 
entirely upon what is neither said of nor present in a subject (i.e. primary substances). If we 
add the plausible premise that where x depends on y, x is non-identical with y, we have a 
good argument that no property instance is a substance.
8Ca/. 1 la25, των 8è καθ’ ίκαστα ούδέν αυτό δπερ έστίν έτέρου λέγεται. I take the καθ’ 
έκεστα to be the species of knowledge, not the instances of those species. If the thing whose 
presence makes people έχιστήμονες (1 la34) is not itself a relative, I presume that there is no 
reason to think that the subject in which this is present is a relative.
9 Mignucci provides some additional arguments against the identification of relatives with 
things; e.g. ‘the larger’ with Jones who is larger than Smith. First, everything will be a
2This is a very cursory examination of the reference of πρός τι in Categories. 
It might emerge that there is a best candidate forw hat τά πρός τι are. That is, there 
might be one interpretation which seems to cover more of the cases than any 
competitor and has the fewest passages which tell against it.10 Alternatively, we may 
find that it is best not to try to map Aristotle’s distinctions onto our own conceptual 
framework of relations, relata and relational properties and try to work with them on 
their own.11 Be that as it may, what I want to suggest now is that to adopt Aristotle’s 
terminology is to invite oonfiision, for it is surely not clear on the face of it just what 
Aristotle is talking about. In what follows, I shall argue that Plotinus falls victim to 
the tar baby of πρός τι, though, by virtue of having the term σχέσις available to him, 
he does make some progress in untangling matters. It falls to Porphyry, I think, to 
see clearly the difference between relations, relata and relational properties. I must, 
however, acknowledge the possibility that this impression may be created by the fact 
that we have fewer texts from Porphyry which are relevant to the issue. Perhaps in 
the lost To Geladius, he too got stuck by the tar baby, but the surviving shorter 
commentary on the Categories seems to be free from this confusion.
Π. Worries about the reality of relations
In Ennead 6.1.6-7 Plotinus presents and attempts to answer some worries 
about the ontological status of relations. Particularly worrisome are what later came 
to be called ‘internal relations’. I shall say that two terms, a and b are internally 
related by relation R just in case a and b have properties which logically necessitate
relative since everything is self-identical. Second, this would obviously contravene Aristotle’s 
rule that no relative is a substance.
10 I f  we must choose between the plausible modem candidates, Mignucci’s identification of τα  
πρός τ ι with relational properties has the fewest problems. It is not unreasonable for Aristotle 
to slide back and forth between describing relational properties and instances of those 
properties.
111 prefer to regard Aristotle’s relatives as what I call ‘accidental beings’. Thus, the relative 
‘the larger’ is a being which bears the relation of accidental identity to Jones. Accidental 
beings are nearly the same thing as what Frank Lewis calls ‘accidental compounds’
(Substance and Predication in Aristotle (Oxford, 1992). Unlike Lewis, however, I prefer to 
withhold judgement about whether all accidental beings must be compounds of some 
particular substance and its accidents. It strikes me that the κυρίως πόσα of Cat. 6 may be 
accidental beings which depend upon the existence o f primary substances in general, but not 
any particular primary substance.
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that the relation between them obtain.12 Some relations are such that pairs (or n- 
tuples) which instantiate them are always internally related by R. Thus, similarity- 
in-respect-of-being-F is an internal relation since any two things, a and b, are 
similar-in-respect-of-being-F only if both are F. This fact about internal relations 
makes it very tempting to be reductionist about the facts regarding whether they 
obtain: that is, the fact that aRpb (where RF is the internal relation necessitated by its 
relata being F) is nothing over and above the fact that Fa and Fb. Whether this 
reduction suceeds depends in large measure on how we count facts. If we individuate 
facts or events by their causes and effects, then it appears the reduction might be suc­
cessful. The similarity, for instance, of a and b has no causal consequences over and 
above the event of a's being and ô’s being F.13 If, however, one accepts an epistemic 
criterion, then these appear to be distinct. One can certainly know that Fa and Fb but 
still fail to know that aRFb. If we accept the causal criterion (and for the sake of 
argument in what follows I will), then we may well be suspicious that there is some 
fact that consists in aRFb over and above the facts Fa and Fb. This thought leads to
12 See Armstrong (A Theory ofUniversals: Universals and Scientific Realism vol 2 
(Cambridge, 1978), p. 85) for this formulation of the intemal/extemal distinction. It seems to 
run counter to the idealists’ use o f‘internal relations’. When they said that all relations are 
internal, one thing they seem to have meant was that the relations that a thing stands in are all 
essential to it. Had it failed to stand in those relations, it wouldn’t have been the very same 
thing that it presently is. Armstrong’s notion of intemality is such that a thing might have an 
internal relation which was necessitated by monadic properties of the relata which were purely 
accidental.
13One’s intuitions about the causal criterion depend on what we allow to count as a property.
To take Aristotle’s example fromMetaph. 6.3, both the robbers and the man may have the 
property ofbeing at the well at 2 o’clock. This necessitates a certain internal relation: 
resembling each other in respect ofbeing at the well at 2 o’clock, or perhaps the relation of 
being in the same place at the same time. But there seem to be causal consequences of their 
both being at the well at 2 which are not consequences of each party being at the well 
individually at 2 — to wit, the man dies by violence and the robbers have more money. I 
think that it is important to the case that these are impure relations which involve essential 
reference to particulars. It is hard to see how the possession of a pure properties and the pure 
internal relation which they entail could fail to be causally indiscernable from one another. To 
take an example from David Armstrong, if a machine sorts things by colour and both a and b 
are red, their resemblance makes no difference to what w ill happen to them in the sorting, 
only their individual colour.
3suspicions about the ontological credentials of the relation Rp.14 15 The facts about 
what terms stand in Rp supervenes on the distribution of F-ness in much the same 
way that, say, the average height of a group of people supervenes on facts about how 
tall the members of the group are. One might rather incautiously put this point by 
saying, ‘There isn’t really the property of having an average height of 200cm 
possessed by groups; rather there are really just properties like having a height of 
195cm and so on had by individuals who are members of a group.’ We might say 
this to someone who mistakenly thought that the average height of the people in the 
seminar might vary independently of the heights of individuals. Similarly, an 
incautious way of asking whether there are relations at all is to ask, ‘Are all relations 
internal?’
There is a cheap and easy way to get an affirmative answer to this question. 
One can use impure relational properties to show that all relations are internal. A 
impure relational property is easily constructed by putting the second subject of the 
relation from which it derives into the predicate place.I} Thus, if a bears R to b, then 
a has the property bearing-R-to-6. But such properties seem to be somehow 
gratuitious. Relational properties, unlike relations, seem to be further analysable into 
parts. What are those parts? They include a relation and another particular. 
Moreover, one can object to impure properties and relations generally. Regarding 
them as genuine properties which must be reckoned with by the Principle of the 
Identity of Indiscernibles makes that principle trivially true. We ought to think that 
impure properties and relations are metaphysically insubstantial to the extent that we 
thought that arguing about the identity of indiscernibles was a substantive 
metaphysical issue.
There is much that could be said about the reality of internal relations and I 
am not entirely comfortable with dismissing them as Armstrong does. Be that as it 
may, we are now in a position to see how the dialectic between the friends of 
relations and reductionists can unfold. One can try to use impure relational 
properties to argue that all relations are internal and thus, on one criterion at least, 
reducible to monadic properties. The alleged reduction might well be a cheat since 
the relational properties which are used to reduce the relation themselves presuppose 
relations. But, depending on how the issue is formulated, it is not an easy cheat to
14 Armstrong’s sparse ontology o f properties and relations has no room for such slackers as R f. 
He endorses what he calls The Reductive Principle fo r internal relations: ‘If two or more 
particulars are internally related, then the relation is nothing more than the possession by the 
particulars of the properties which necessitate them. ’ (p. 86)
15 Lloyd Humberstone (‘Intrinsic/Extrinsic’, forthcoming in Synthèse, July 1996) considers a 
number of ways in which one can generate relational properties from relations. This tactic, 
which he calls ‘place fixing’ produces Khamara’s category of impure relational properties.
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detect. For this reason a grasp o f the distinction between relational properties 
(particularly impure ones) and relations is essential i f  one is adequately to address 
the question o f whether there are relations or not. In Ennead 6, Plotinus is 
grappling with this very issue, but seems to lack the distinction between relational 
properties and relations.
HL Plotinus and the reality of relations
In 6.1.6 Plotinus acknowledges that only some relations pose questions 
about whether they exist dr not. Some of the relatives have an έργον or á single 
activity which leaves us in no doubt about their existence.16 Thus, knowledge is 
active in relation to its object and brings about an activity — knowing. Similarly, the 
measure does a single work in relation to the íitéásüred thing: it measures it. "But 
what product (άπογέννώμένον) would the like have iii relation to the like?' asks 
Plotinus. He worries that in such cases there is nothing over and above the 
qualification of each thing by the quality. This, then, is just the point about the 
reality of internal relations. However, it is immediately turned into an issue about 
the mind-dependence of relations.
But what is the relation (σχέσις) other than our judgement when 
we compare (παραβαλλόντων) things which are what they are by 
themselves (τα έφ’ έαυτων όντα & έστι) and say ‘this thing and 
this thing have the same size and the same quality', and ‘this man 
has produced this man, and this man controls this man9? (6.1.6,
21-5)
; 16 Another interesting question is whether Plotinus has any Specific philosophical school in
I mind in this passage. It seems pretty clear that sonie philosophers argued against the reality
I of relatives. The Epicurean Polystratus insists* presumably against some unnamed opponents,
I on the reality of τά πρός τ ι (On Irrational Contempt xxv-xxvii). Sextus claims that the
I outline account of some of the dogmatists commit them to the unreality of relatives because 
they say that πρός τί σέτι τό πρός έτέρφ νοούμενον rather than ϋπάρχον Μ  viii, 453-4.
He then rehearses a series of skeptical arguments for the unreality of relatives from 455-62, 
Von Amim included bothM  viii, 453 (= Π.404) andM  ix, 352 (= Π.80) in SVF. Jonathon 
 ^ Barnes has recently árguéd that the position on thé mind-dependence of relatives articulated
I here is not, in fact, Stoic ('B its and Pieces' in Mario Mignucci and Jonathon Barnes (eds),
I  Matter and Metaphsyics:Fourth Symposium Hellenisticum (Naples, 1988), 251-9). I think 
I; that Barnes may be a bit hasty. Elsewhere I argue that the Stoics have a motive for saying that
I  things do not have parts καθ’ αυτό and that a plausible case can be made that they regard
I  parts in the same way in which they regard limits: somethings which are neither corporeal nor
HI incorporeal (cf. SVFR.4%7 and 488; Diogenes Laertius viii. 135). Both parts and limits are, of
H course, relatives.
4Similarly,
What then would there be over and above these things which are 
related to each other except our thinking their juxtaposition? 
Exceeding is a matter of one thing of one definite size and another 
of another definite size; and this one and that one are two different 
things; the comparison (παραβολλή) eûmes from us and is not in 
them. (6.1.6,29-33)
We can isolate two sorts of confusion in these passages. One concerns mind-depend­
ence and the other concerns relational properties. I will discuss them in turn.
If it were possible to Show that all relations are internal, there would be at 
least two ways of describing this outcome. One could be an eliminativist about them 
and say that, because ‘relation’ implies the existence of something over and above 
the having of monadic properties, the fact that all relations are internal shows that 
there are no relations. Alternatively, one might say that, if  all relations are internal, 
then every relation just is the pair of monadic predicates which necessitates it. This, 
I take it, is one kind of reduction. In neither case is there any issue about mind- 
dependence. The only way in which our cognitive attitudes toward relations are 
involved is that, in the first case, we might say that we thought that there were 
relations (but we were wrong) and in the second that by thinking of the relation we 
really think of the relevant pair of monadic properties.
It sounds as if in 6.1.6 Plotinus is considering the reductionist view. What 
would be the case if the relation Were nothing but our judgement?
What would sitting and standing be besides the thing which is 
sitting or standing? And State, when it is said of the thing which 
has it, would rather signify having [the last Aristotelian category?], 
and when it is said of the thing had, it would signify qualify. (25- 
9)
The thought here seems to be that πρός τι would be reduced to different categories. 
Contrary to what we initially thought, relatives are qualities, etc. But, when Plotinus 
is reflecting on the contents of 6.1.6 at the end of 6.1.7 it sounds as if  he is 
considering the eliminitavist interpretaton.17 He notes that some relations can cease 
to obtain simply if the relata change their position.
17 That Plotinus moves back and forth between the eliniinativist and reductionist 
interpretations would not be surprising if  he was reacting to something like the position
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* *
From such cases in particular came our suspicion that in things of 
this kind the relation is nothing. (21-2)
To say that the relation is nothing is not to say that it is something different from 
what we first thought that it was. It is rather to say that there is no such thing as the 
1 relation.
Plotinus formulates an explicitly eliminativist view about relations in the 
context of a discussion of the Stoic conception of soul. According to Plotinus, the 
Stoics think that life and soul are nothing but the material breath, but they also grant 
that there are some portions of the breath which are lifeless. To explain this, they 
say that life and soul are the breath so disposed (πώς έχον). He then asks:
But what is this so disposed which they are always talking about, 
and in which they are forced to take refuge when they are made to 
admit another working principle besides body? . . .  either they will 
say that this ‘so disposed’ and relation (σχέσις) is one of the 
beings or it is not. If not, then soul is only breath and 'so disposed' 
just a word. And thus it will happen for them that they will not be 
saying that soul and God are anything but matter, and all these will 
be names, and there will only be matter. But if the relation is 
among the things that are and18 it is something else besides the 
substrate and the matter, in matter but immaterial itself—because it 
is not again composed of matter and form—then it would be a 
λόγος and not a body and so of a different nature. 4.7.4, 9-21
On Plotinus’ view, eliminativism is the only option open to the Stoics and if they 
take it, their defence of soul collapses (in addition to the unintuitive result that 
σχέσις is just a word). They cannot reduce it to one of their material principles 
because a σχέσις is not simply the substrate and matter but must be λόγος and 
immaterial.
This passage sheds light on the discussion in 6.1.6 in two ways. First, it 
confirms what 6.1.7, 21-2 suggested: Plotinus is able to formulate an eliminativist
advanced by Sextus in M. 453-61. It is not clear whether Sextus takes the arguments that he 
υ gives here to support that thesis that τά πρός τ ι άνύπαρκτά έστι (462) or that they έν 
έπινοίςι μόνον έστι (453). Perhaps Sextus assumes that if  relatives are merely in the mind, 
then they do not exist in the sense in which everyone thinks that they exist.
k 18We must, I think, take this κα ί as epexegetical. If die meaning of the first conjunct leaves 
room for die denial of the second conjunct, then Plotinus’ argument has no force against the 
Stoics.
5view. For the relation to be ‘not among the things that are’ is for it to be a word 
which does not latch onto anything. People who use the word do not manage to say 
either anything true or, alternatively, what they want to say. In either case, here at 
least, he is able to distinguish issues about elimination horn mind-dependence. 
Further, we can now see at least one reason why he would want to defend the reality 
of relations. The Stoics might respond to Plotinus’ argument by saying that πώς 
έχον is real but still material by claiming that the disposition is nothing over and 
above the qualities which necessitate it. These, of course, are material according to 
them.
It is also important to note that in 6.1.6, 24-5 Plotinus puts expresses 
position of his hypothetical objector by helping himself to impure relational 
properties to turn seemingly external relations into internal ones. The relation 
between size and equality is very different from that between mastership and control 
over a man. From the fact that a has length I and b has l-n, it follows that a  exceeds 
b in length and this is true for any other c which has length l-n. The size itself is 
not object directed. However, from the fact that a has control over a man and b is 
controlled by a man, it does not follow that a is the master of b. Control over a man 
is not control over b. Plotinus bridges the gap by using the demonstrative pronouns 
‘this’ and ‘that’, but what is at issue in this purported reduction are really the 
possession of the impure relational properties having-control-over-b and being- 
controlled-by-a. A sharp distinction between relations and relational properties, 
especially impure ones, would help him see the difficulty here.
What of Plotinus’ defence against the reductionist/eliminativist? The first 
part of 6.1.7 consists in a long and convoluted conditional, the consequent of which 
is that we ought not to be worried about arguments for the claim that relations do not 
exist. Each part of the conditional, however, is best interpreted as yet another reason 
for thinking that relations are real. If it were the case that there was nothing to a 
relation except our judgement, then it would be the case that our judgements were 
false and σχέσις would be an empty term. But the reductionist need not claim that 
the reducibUity of relations to monadic properties implies that the judgement ‘a is 
similar to b' is false. It is rather the case that it simply means ‘a is F and b is F’. 
Nor would ‘relation’ be a meaningless term. It simply indicates that properly co­
ordinated monadic predicates hold for each of the relata.
Plotinus’ remaining arguments are not much better. If it is true that a is 
before b and that ‘before’ is something other than the relata, then relations are real. 
The reductionist can grant that ‘before’ signifies something other than the relata: it 
signifies that the relata are such that appropriately co-ordinated monadic predicates 
obtain in each case. This he can do if  we allow him relational predicates such as 
‘being-prior-in-time-to-b’ or ‘happening at noon on Friday’. Plotinus also claims 
that relations are real if aRb is true even when we don't say or think it. The critic 
can allow this too: aRpb is true even when we don't judge this simply because aRpb
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is nothing more than Fa and Fb. The same can be said for Plotinus’ claim that re­
lations are real if our knowledge of them is directed upon a knowable.
Having given what he regards as good arguments against the reductionist, 
Plotinus asks what is common to all relations. It is not enough, he says, for 
something to be πρός τι if  it is simply ‘of another’ as a soul is a soul of a body. We 
have a genuine case of πρός τι only when
the existence derives from nowhere other than from the relation (έκ 
της σχέσεως) and the existence is not that of the subjects, but of 
what is said πρός τι. For instance, the double πρός the half gives 
existence to neither the two-cubit long nor in general to two, nor to 
the one-cubit long, nor generally to one, but when these are in a 
relation (κατά τήν σχέσις), besides being two and one 
respectively, the one is called and is double and the other will be 
half in the same way. Both of them generate together out of 
themselves something else, the double and the half, which came 
into being in relation to one another, and the being is not 
something other than the reciprocity; it belongs to the double fiom 
exceeding the half and to the half from being exceeded. (6.1.7, 26- 
35).
The double and the half are clearly the things said πρός τι here, but what are these? 
It can't be the relational properties ‘being half of the length of a’ and ‘being double 
the length of b ’ because these are not generated. It might be the instances of the 
relational properties or it might be the relata, not qua one-cubit and so on, but qua 
double and half. The fact that he distinguishes the existence of the πρός τι from that 
of the ΰποκειμένον does not mean that he is removing from consideration the 
υποκείμενον qualified in a certain way, though perhaps it makes it more likely that 
he has in mind the property instance. Worse, it seems that the distinction between 
the relation and the monadic predicates which necessitate the relation is in danger. 
On the one hand, we are told that the existence of the πρός τι λέγεται derives from 
the σχέσις, but he also says that the being of double and half belongs to the double 
from exceeding the half and the half by being exceeded. But the exceeding is simply 
a matter of the possession of the monadic properties ‘having length V  and ‘having 
length f-n’ respectively. But it is ju st this determination o f the relation by the 
monadic properties o f the relata which is the issue with the reductionist. Plotinus is 
hampered in his response here because the example that he has chosen as his 
illustration is already an internal relation—the kind that is most susceptible to 
reduction.
6Unfortunately, Plotinus’ example of double and half is common to his other 
attempts to explicate relatives. In summing up at the end of 6.3.28 he writes:
And about the relative (πρός τι), that it is the relation (σχέσις) of 
one thing in relation to (πρός) another, and that there is a relative 
whenever the relation of a substance makes it; the substance is not 
a relative qua substance, but either insofar as (καθό) it is part—for 
example hand or head—or cause or principle or element
This passage makes the identification of relatives with the subject qua double 
tempting. If καθό μέρος is doing the same sort of classificatoiy work here as $ 
ούσία, then Plotinus’ point is that the relative is not the thing considered as a 
substance, but rather the thing considered as a double.
This is not to say that Plotinus makes no progress at all in the matter of rela­
tives. There is the threat that the criterion of simply being ’of another’ will allow the 
relatives to engulf all the other categories except substance since each accident is an 
accident o f a substance.19 Plotinus provides an interesting response to this threat. In 
6.3.21 he argues that movement ought not be referred to πρός τι simply because it is 
of something, since by the same token quantity and quality will be under relation.
But if it is because these are something, even if they are of 
something insofar as they are, that the one is called quality and the 
other quantity, and in the same way, since motion is motion of 
something, it is something before it is o f  something, and this we 
should grasp on its own (έφ’ αύτοΰ). On the whole, one should set 
down as πρός τι not what first is, and then  is of something else, but 
what the relation (σχέσις) generates without anything other thing 
besides the relation by which it is called. For example, the double, 
insofar as it is called double, takes its generation and existence in 
the comparision with the one-ciibit and, without anything before 
this coming to mind, it is called and is double in being compared to 
something else.
It is a promising beginning. Neither motion nor quantity or quality in general is a 
relative because each has a nature of its own prior to being an accident of a thing. 
Again we are told that the πρός τι is generated from the σχέσις. But we have no
l9Cf. Simplicius in Cat. 63,23-8 for a report of “some” who did this. It would be nice to know 
if  this was also the ground for Xenocrates’ insistence on the adequacy of Plato’s categories of 
καθ’ αυτό and πρός τι (Simplic. in Cat 63,21-3 = Xenocrates fr. 12) in contrast with 
Aristotle's categories.
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clue here whether the πρός τι is the property instance or the thing so qualified. 
Moreover, παραβεβλήσθαι is somewhat worrying, especially in such close proximity 
to νοούμεvov. While ‘comparison’ and ‘in being compared’ can be used in an 
impersonal sense, they can also carry the connotation of an act of comparing. 
Presumably what Plotinus does not want to say is that the σχέσις which generates 
the double and the half is our act of comparing the size of the two things. This, I 
take it, would make the relation mind-dependent. This seems to be confirmed by 
what he says in 6.1.7:
. .  .one must respond that thé relation itself produces the relatives, 
and they are not produced merely by being said to be in relation to 
another. When there is softie existence, whether it is of a different 
or in relation to a different, it possesses a nature prior to being a 
relative. Actuality and movement and state, though being o f 
another, do not lose priority to being relative and being thought in 
themselves; otherwise in this way everything will be a relative, for 
all things have some relation to something, as in the case of soul.
His point must surely be that we can be aware of the comparison (in the impersonal 
sense) which generated the relatives prior to awareness of it, without being aware of 
any καθ’ αύτό φύσις before the comparison. But it is notable, I think, that the same 
vocabulary shows up in the passages from 6.1.6-7 quoted above. Perhaps it is for this 
reason that Plotinus equates the réduction of relations to the properties which 
necessitate them with the mind-dependence of relations.
To sum up, Plotinus is not able adequately to address the question of the 
existence of relations because he confitses the reduction of all relations to internal 
relations with the issue of the mind-dependence of relations. Further, he confuses 
reduction with elimination. Finally, he is not able to assess the prospects for such a 
reduction because he does not distinguish between pure and impure relational 
properties. Indeed, at times it is not even clear that he adequately distinguishes 
between relations and relational properties—pure or impure. Many o f  these 
difficulties are not of Plotinus’ own making. He has handled the ambiguous 
vocabulary of πρός τι from Categories 7 and becorhe stuck to it.
IV. Porphyry the hero 
Porphyry never addresses the reductionist gambit on its own. He does, how­
ever, come close to this line of argument in the course of clarifying Aristotle’s second
7account of relatives in chapter 7 of Categories.™ There he encounters the objection 
that this account is circular. He gives the following defence: We say sometimes that 
white qua white is the colour that pierces the eyes, so that no one will think that the 
body which also happens to be called white pierces the eyes. We have not thereby 
included the term 'white' in the definition of White in any harmful way. Aristotle did 
not say that relatives are the same as being reláted to something, rather they are the 
things for which their being [qua relatives] is the same as their being somehow 
related to something.
So relatives consist in the relation (σχέσις) of subjects to one 
another, and do not exist in virtue of the subjects of this relation, 
the being of which is not the same as their being related to one 
another. But the relation that obtains between relatives is just their 
standing in some way in relation to one another, so that relatives 
are indeed those things for which th d r being is the same as their 
being in someway related to one another. (124,21-25, tr. Strange)
In this passage Porphyry not only clarifies Aristotle's claim, but he also defends a 
realist view of relations. They are emphatically not the same as the being of the 
subjects. Nor are they reducible to the properties of thé relata:
For ‘double’—let us suppose it is the ratio o f four to two—does not 
belong to the relatives in virtue of the four or in virtue of the two, 
but insofar as the four stands to the two in the ratio (έν λόγψ) 
double and the two to the four in the ratio (έν λόγψ) of half. 
(124,19-21, tr. Strange)
The béing of the relation is not reducible to the fact that one'relata is four [measures] 
aiid the other two. The relation obtains in virttie of//re ratio between them. In what 
follows he articulates the distiitction between1 relations and relational properties 
which is crucial to the defence of sucha realist approach.
The relation is like an intermediate term (μέΰον) between the 
subjects of the relation, in virtue of which the relative terms come
MAt 8a31 Aristotle faces the problem that if the criterion for being a relative is simply to be of 
another, then parts o f both primary and secondary substances will be relatives. He considers 
the, apparently narrower, criterion τά πρός τι ο ίς τό είνα ι ταΰτόν έστι τφ πρός πως Ιχειν.
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to exist: they acquire a property21 over and above those of their 
subjects precisely in that consideration of them reveals a certain 
connection between them, in virtue of which they are called by the 
names of the relative terms. (125,17-19)
Porphyry here makes it clear that he takes Aristotle’s τά κρός τι to be relational 
properties. Moreover, he explicitly acknowledges the dependence of such properties 
upon their constituent relation. It is this, and not the properties, which is like a 
middle term.
The differences here between Porphyry and Plotinus are subtle. It is, of 
course, possible that what we have left of Porphyry’s writing simply does not allow 
him the opportunity to put his foot in his mouth. But, allowing for this, we may say 
that:
1. Porhyry does not use the language of comparison (παραβολλή) in 
the statement of his examples, preferring the decidedly impersonal 
ratio (λόγος). Perhaps for this reason he in no way suggests that 
relations are mind-dependent
2. Porphyry, but not Plotinus, consistently maintains that relations are 
independent of the monadic properties of the relata. This is so 
even with a relation like double which seems to be internal. Thus, 
he is strongly realist about relations.
3. Porphyry, but not Plotinus, consistently uses Aristotle’s misleading 
vocabulary of πρός τι to refer to the relational properties which the 
subjects of a relation acquire by virtue of standing in the relation.
V. And what difference it makes 
Let us suppose that Porphyry is careful to distinguish relations from 
relational properties. He will then be well equiped to defend the reality of relations 
from arguments which seek to reduce relations to monadic properties had by the 
relata. What difference does the reality of relations make to Porphyry’s own 
philosophical views?
21Strange, I think, understands πλεονάζουσα παρά τά υποκείμενα to imply that they appear 
to acquire a further property. He translates τά υποκείμενα κατά σχέσιν τήν πρός άλληλα 
πλεονεκτοΰντα φαίνεται at 124,29-30 in the same way. In 125,17-19 the word ποιάν 
actually appears, but he takes it with τινα συνάφειαν. Its position in the sentence certainly 
suggests this.
8It has been alleged that Poiphyiy “telescopes” the three distinct hypostases 
of Plotinus’ metaphysics, producing a more “monistic” system.22 The idea is that the 
tension in Plotinus between nous and soul as independent hypostases and as things 
which have their being in relation to the One is resolved in favor of dependence: 
because nous and soul exist in relation to the One, they are mere appearances and 
thus, in some sense, illusory. In particular, it has been claimed that the embodiment 
of the soul is an illusion of thought. One reason for this concerns Porphyiy’s claim 
that the soul is not in the body but is rather related to it. In Sententia 28 he claims 
that soul is not present in a body like a beast in a cage or water in a skin. It could not 
be, for soul, like all incorporeals, is both everywhere and nowhere (Sent. 1, 2, 27, 31, 
35). Instead, soul’s powers are made manifest in a certain place through a certain 
διαθέσις of the soul.23 This is true of all incorporeals. When they “act” upon 
bodies, it is not they who actually do the acting. Porphyry adapts Plotinus’ notion of 
an inner and outer activity to explain how incorporeals act on corporeals. In V.4.2, 
Plotinus distinguished between the inner ένέργεια of fire — the essential heat that it 
has that makes it what it is — and the heat that it gives off. In this context, Plotinus 
is discussing how Νούς results from the One without the One undergoing any kind 
of change. Just as with fire, there is an inner activity of the One which is its 
substance and something different which is generated from it — a συνούσης 
ένεργείας. Similarly, Porphyry identifies a δύναμις that is proximate to bodies 
when an incorporeal like soul inclines toward them. This δύναμις is not itself a 
second soul: Porphyry wants no part of this idea which may be found in Numenius.24 
Nonetheless, Porphyry uses language which suggests that it is in some sense 
substantial (δύναμιν ύπέστεησε Sent. 4). Smith has argued that this δύναμις is to 
be equated with the Plotinian lower soul and is regarded by Porphyry as like 
immanent form.23 This is tempting and would perhaps explain Porphyry’s apparent 
inconsistency on the question of whether embodiment detracts from the soul’s unity. 
In Sententia 37 he claims that it does not, while in 28 he says that it does. Perhaps 
the “unparticipated soul” is not diminished but the soul which is like immanent form 
is. However, this account of the ontological status of the δύναμις doesn’t quite do 
justice to some of the details of Porphyty’s account. He insists that a soul’s activity is
22 A.C. Lloyd in The Cambridge History o f Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, 
chapter 18, ed A.H. Armstrong (Cambridge, 1967).
23 Sent 27,12-14, διαθέσει τοίνυν ποι$ έκεΐ εύρίσκεται, όπου καί διάκειται, τόπφ δν 
πανταχοΰ καί ούδαμοΰ. διό ποι$ διαθέσει ή ύπέρ ουρανόν ή έν μέρει που τού κόσμου 
κεκράτηται.
24 Stobaeus L 350,25.
23 Andrew Smith, Porphyry’s Place in the Neoplatonic Tradition (The Hague, 1974), 12.
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localised because of a kind of inclination and disposition toward a certain body. This 
is not so in the relation between Forms and immanent forms in other cases. The 
presence of whiteness in the paper on my desk is a result of the contemplation of 
World Soul or Nature on passive matter for Plotinus (and presumably also for 
Porphyry); cf. Plot. ΙΠ.8.2. It is not the case that White Itself is localised here 
because the very Form inclines or has a disposition toward it. Thus, though the 
δύναμις which the body receives when the soul inclines toward it may be 
ontologically on a par with immanent form — that is, it may be every bit as real as 
immanent form, pacé Lloyd — it is not simply immanent form. I shall argue that the 
δύναμις discussed in Sententia 4 and 28 is in fact best thought of as a  relational 
property which a body acquires when it stands in a certain relation to incorporeal 
soul.
The Sententia contain hints of the relational doctrine of embodiment, but 
the fragments of Σύμμικτα ζητήματα are a bit more explicit.
When it is said that soul is in a body this (kies not mean that it is in 
the place where the body is. Rather, the soul is in a relation or 
present to the body, as we say God is in us. For we say that the 
soul is attached to the body tty a relation or relational inclination 
and disposition, as we say that the lover is attached to the beloved, 
not physically or spatially, but by a relation. ... If then an 
intelligible can stand in a relation to a place or a thing which has a 
place, then we may by a misuse of language say that it is here on 
account of the fact that its activity (ένέργειαν) is here and we take 
the activity or relation for the place. But we ought to say ‘it acts 
here’ when we say ‘it is here’. (26IF, 42-63, Smith)
I take it that the ένέργεια which is in a place is the actuality of the δύναμις that is 
discussed in Sententia 4 and 28. It is something that a location or thing acquires 
when it stands in a relation to an intelligible like soul. It will be a relational property 
which a body acquires not because of what it is in itself, but because it stands in a 
certain relation to something else. This is just the distinction that Porphyry draws at 
in Cat 124,26-30 and 125,16-19.
What is this relation? It may well be that there are a variety of relations. 
Porphyry is not clear about whether the inclination which a soul has toward a 
particular body is a matter of that soul’s own volitioa Note that in Sententia 7-9 we 
seem to have two deaths or separations of soul and body: one which nature secures 
and one which philosophy aims at. These are independent of one another. Perhaps 
one relation of inclination is a matter of the soul deciding whether to live for what is
9above or what is below, while the other is necessitated by the falling away from 
perfection exhibited in all emmanation from the One. The former is certainly 
suggested by the analogy of lover and beloved in this passage.
In Porphyry’s examples from in Cat., both the things that stand in a relation 
acquire a relational property over and above the properties they have considered only 
in themselves. This presents a complication, for Porphyry seems to want to deny that 
the soul undergoes any kind of affection when it inclines toward a body.26 But if 
inclination is a relation which obtains between the soul and a body in virtue of which 
the bodÿ acquires the relational property I have identified with the δύναμις Porphyry 
describes in Sent. 4 and 28, how is it that the soul acquires no relational property? 
Will it not be changed by inclining toward a body? One way that Porphyry could 
address this problem is to appeal to the idea that gaining and losing properties in the 
category of πρός τι is not a change in a thing’s substance or its accidents. They are, 
as he says, external to their subjects.27 But this does not make relatives unreal. 
Aristotle’s view is that τά πρός τι are the least of all things substance (.Metaph. 
1088a24-bl), but being the least of all things is not yet to be nothing at all and there 
is no reason to think that Porphyry would find anything in this with which to 
disagree. In fact, because Porphyry is careful to distinguish between relational 
properties and relations it is even less likely that he thinks of the soul’s embodiment 
as in some way illusory or unreal. For, even if the relational property that the soul 
acquires is ‘least of all things a substance’. Porphyry is capable of distinguishing this 
relational property from the relation which endows the soul with it. This relation or 
relations — perhaps a kind of concern together with a natural inclination — are 
quite real.
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26 Sent. 21,18-21, ώς ούν τό τρέπεσθαι κα ί πάσχειν έν τφ συνθέτω τφ έξ ύλης τε καί 
είδους, δπερ ήν τό σώμα-ού μήν τή ύλη τούτο προσήν-, ούτω και τό ζήν και 
άποθνησκειν καί πάσχειν κατά τούτο έν τφ συνθέτφ έκ ψυχής καί σώματος θεωρείται 
But see Sent 18,6-8, τά μέν γάρ ύλης κεχωρισμένα κα ί σωμάτων ένεργείαις ήν τά  
αυτά, τά  δέ ύλη πλησιάζοντα και σώμασιν αυτά μέν άπαθή, ^ά δέ έφ’ ών θεωρείται 
πάσχει. The things that incline to matter and body may be the ένέργεια or δύναμις which 
the soul’s relation to body engenders in the body.
27 in Cat 125,25-28, *Ότι έν τοίς ύποκειμένοις έστίν ούτε ώς ούσίας συμπληρωτικόν 
ούτε ώς άλλο τ ι τών συμβεβηκότων, & έν αύτοΐς τοίς ύποκειμένοις γίνεται, οΐον πάθος 
ή ένέργεια, άλλά τι έξωθεν, διό καί μή πασχόντων τών υποκειμένων γίνεται κα ί 
άπογίνεται.
